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1. Introduction
Pressure is a defining feature of many social and economic environments. Final 
exams in school, the last round of a job interview, giving a speech and answering 
questions at a press conference are some examples in which stakes are high. In many 
instances, principals (evaluators), whether in a competitive or non-competitive setting, 
use a one-shot process to gather information or evaluate the agent. This process is likely 
to induce pressure since agents understand that they will not have the opportunity to 
repeat the process—or that doing so will be costly. The psychology literature has 
identified a number of factors that produce “choking under pressure” (Baumeister, 
1984). The most relevant sources of pressure seem to be the presence of an audience, 
competition with others, personal traits, and one’s own ego-relevant threat (see Ariely et 
al., 2009). Research in psychology has shown that an emphasis on the importance of the 
process can harm the individual’s capacity to exhibit her “true” capability (Beilock, 
2011).1 Moreover, the strain of pressure on performance is heterogeneous across 
individuals.  
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence showing that males and females react 
differently to increases in pressure, as defined by the size of the stakes at hand. Using 
detailed information over a period of 12 years on several cohorts of high school students 
who take numerous tests with varying stakes, we show that there is a change in the 
gender gap in performance when the tests’ stakes increase. In particular, we find that 
females do relatively better on tests with low stakes but that this difference is reduced, 
and can even disappear, when the stakes are high. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of a gender gap in the impact of choking 
under pressure. 
We follow several cohorts of students through their six years of high school (ages 
12 to 18). For all subjects in each academic year (typically ten or 11 subjects), students 
undertake three types of tests with varying stakes (low, medium, and high). During the 
year, students undertake several low-stakes tests, two medium-stakes tests at the end of 
 
1
 In her book “Choke: What the Secrets of the Brain Reveal about Getting it Right When You Have To,” 
Beilock (2011) summarizes the existing literature in social psychology and emphasizes the similarity 
between students, athletes and business people who choke when the stakes are high. The mechanisms that 
could produce such a reaction include increased arousal, narrowing of attention, and the preoccupation 
with the reward itself. It has also been identified that consciously thinking about a task that is usually 
done automatically can be detrimental to performance. Increased pressure can induce a shift from this 
“automated” to a “controlled” procedure. See Yerkes and Dodson, 1908; Langer and Imber, 1979; 
Camerer, Lowenstein and Prelen, 2005 for details on this literature. 
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each semester, and then a high-stakes test at the end of the academic year. The test 
stakes vary from five percent to 27 percent of the final grade, which, for each subject, is 
a weighted average of all the tests taken throughout the academic year. At the end of 
high school, students undertake national-level (standardized) tests, similar to the SAT in 
the United States, which are very high-stakes. The grade in the national level test counts 
for 50 percent of the university entry grade. 
This natural experiment provides an ideal testing ground for whether pressure 
generates gender gaps in performance. There is a large literature that documents gender 
differences in labor-market outcomes (see Altonji and Blank, 1999; Bertrand, 2009). 
Understanding if differential reactions to pressure exist can potentially explain part of 
this gap, but using labor-market information is problematic. Once in the labor market, 
men and women will have made choices shaped by their professional environment and 
personal circumstances and, potentially, by their preference for and reaction to pressure. 
In our setting, we focus on a period in individuals’ educational career when, for the last 
time, they are exposed to a homogeneous and compulsory procedure that will affect 
their future success in higher education and in the labor market. 
The analysis shows that female students outperform male students by 0.18 
standard deviations of the mean in low-stakes tests but by only 0.11 standard deviations 
in high-stakes tests. Moreover, in the national-level exams, the gap is reversed, such that 
male students outperform female students by 0.02 standard deviations, although this 
difference is not statistically significant. Interestingly, consistent with the gender 
differential reaction to the underlying stakes, in the year prior to college, just before the 
national exams occur, we find that the gender differential response to pressure occurs 
only for those subjects who are evaluated in the national exams. Our results persist over 
time, within and between academic years, and throughout the performance distribution. 
Gender differences in academic attainment and achievement have been widely 
documented (see, for example, Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006).  Differences in the 
nature of tests—in particular, their objectiveness, their competitive nature and the skills 
they measure—have been exploited to identify potential channels that explain these 
gaps. Some noteworthy examples are Cornwell, Mustard, and Van Parys (2013), Lavy 
(2008), and Örs, Palomino and Peyrache (2013).2 Our setting uses a quasi-experimental 
 
2
 Cornwell, Mustard, and Van Parys (2011) show that the apparent advantage that female students had in 
grades provided by a teacher versus those provided by an external evaluation disappears once non-
cognitive traits are controlled for. Similarly, Lavy (2008) compares blind and non-blind scores on college 
matriculation exams of male and female students and finds evidence of gender stereotyping and 
discrimination against male students by teachers. Örs, Palomino and Peyrache (2013) show that when 
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design in the evaluation system to study gender differences in performance, where the 
variation exploited is the test stakes, while other factors, such as the evaluators, the 
competitiveness of the environment, the material evaluated or format of the exam, are 
held constant. 
A recent literature shows that women underperform in competitive environments 
and, when given the opportunity, shy away from competition (Gneezy, Niederle and 
Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh, 2009; Shurchkov, 2012; Buser, Niederle, 
Oosterbek; 2013; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2014). The emphasis in this literature is on the 
gender of the opponent(s) and the task at hand. In our setting, since pressure is not 
defined as having a competitive nature, the rewards are independent of the performance 
of others. Here, the gaps in performance result from the pressure that arises due to 
variation in the size of the tests’ stakes. In an experimental literature that studies how 
stakes affect performance through effort choice, stakes are defined as monetary 
incentives. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) review the experimental results and conclude 
that the size of the monetary payoff has little effect on effort choice.3 Ariely et al. 
(2009) provide experimental evidence on choking under pressure becoming relevant as 
the size of the stakes is increased.  They suggest that there is an optimal amount of 
motivation/pressure that leads to a maximal performance, and deviation from this will 
reduce performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the 
evaluating procedure that generated it. In Section 3, we present the main results and 
perform a number of robustness checks. Section 4 concludes by discussing the 
implications of our findings.  
   
female and male students compete against each other to enter college, male students perform better than 
predicted by their previous high school grades, and woman perform worse.  
3
 Lavy and Angrist (2009), in an educational setting, show that providing monetary incentives to students 
in low-achieving schools improves the matriculation rates of girls, but has no effect on boys. 

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The data come from a high school in Barcelona, Spain that offers four years of 
Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO), for ages 12 to 15, and Bachillerato, which 
comprises the two years prior to university, for ages 16 to 18. There are, therefore, six 
levels, which we refer to as Levels 1 to 6. At the end of Level 6, students who plan to 
pursue a university degree take externally designed and graded national exams 
(Selectividad). 
During each academic year, students take several exams in each of their subjects, 
and the final score for each subject is determined as follows. In each trimester, students 
take bi-monthly tests and an end-of-trimester test, except in trimester three, when they 
have an end-of-year test. The final grade is determined by a weighted average of the 
first, second, and third trimester tests and the end-of-year test. The weights on the bi-
monthly tests in each trimester are around 2.5 percent. The end-of-trimester test in 
trimester one and two is worth 11 percent and the end-of-year test 27 percent.4 We 
define the bi-monthly, end-of-term, and end-of-year tests as “low,” “medium,” and 
“high” stakes, respectively. The evaluation system is summarized in Figure 1. 
Students in Level 6 take national-level exams, which, together with their high-
school test scores in Levels 5 and 6, determine their college entry grade.5 The weight 
assigned to the Level 5 and Level 6 end-of-year grade is 25 percent each, and 50 percent 
is assigned to the national-level exam grade. We, therefore, define the national exams as 
being “super-high” stakes tests. The subject material evaluated in the national exams is 
the same as that covered in Level 6. However, not all subjects are tested in the national 
exam, which allows for some interesting variation that we will exploit later. 
2.2. Data Description 
We have panel data on students’ test scores for all subjects, through levels 1 to 6, 
between the academic years 2000 to 2012, giving a total sample of 1,404 students. For 
each subject per academic year, we observe eight measures of performance in low-
 
4
 The weights described are the reduced-form weights resulting from the following compounded formula. 
Every trimester, a grade is constructed as follows. In the first two trimesters, the trimester-grade is 
constructed giving 60 percent of the weight to the (average) bi-monthly exams and 40 percent to the end-
of-trimester exam. In the third trimester, the grade is determined only by the bi-monthly exams. The final 
grade is determined by giving 27 percent of the weight to trimester one and two, 18 percent to trimester 
three and 27 percent to the end-of-the-year exam. 
5
 College admission in Spain is administered through a centralized system. Applicants submit a single 
application with a list of up to eight major-university options. Students are then ordered according to their 
grades and are assigned to their preferred option following that order.  
2. Study Design
2.1. Evaluation System 
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stakes tests, two in medium-stakes tests, and one in high-stakes tests.6 All test scores are 
standardized to a distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation. The 
standardization is done by academic year, level, subject and test type. The sample size 
varies by subjects, including most students in compulsory subjects but far fewer in 
elective subjects. In addition, we have information on the scores for the national exams 
(super-high stakes). We also have information on subject teachers for some, but not all, 
years. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, separately for each level.  
From Table 1, we can see that there are an equal number of female and male 
students. Each year, students take around eight subjects.7 In Levels 1 to 4, all subjects 
are common and compulsory. High school in Spain is compulsory until age 16 (end of 
Level 4). From the table, we see that around 20 percent of students leave at the end of 
Level 4. While some students may choose not to pursue Levels 5 and 6 and, thus, the 
national-level exams, others might choose to do so in another school. Some, but fewer, 
students leave at the end of other levels. Students performing very well in the low-
stakes and medium-stakes tests, such that they are getting the highest possible grade 
throughout the course, may be given an exemption from the high-stakes test. Table 1 
shows that around five percent of students are exempt from the test. More importantly, 
across genders—for both those who leave and those who are exempt—there is no 
difference at any level.8    
3. Analysis and Results
3.1. Baseline Regressions 
We start by estimating gender differences in school performance on different 
types of tests: 
(1)     	
  , 
where the outcome variable, , is the standardized score for student i, in level l, 
subject s, and academic year y. Female takes value one if the student is female and zero 
otherwise. Table 2 shows the estimation results.  
 
6
 In the data, the test scores for the low-stakes tests are typically provided for each month and are an 
average of the bi-monthly tests.  
7
 Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes all the subjects that students take per level. 
8
 We will discuss this further in Section 3.  
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Panel A, column 1 presents the results for the gender difference in the final end-
of-year test score. Columns 2 to 5 present the results for tests with different stakes: low-
stakes, medium-stakes, high-stakes, and super-high-stakes, respectively. In Panel B, we 
restrict the analysis to final-year students (Level 6) who take the super-high-stakes test 
(Selectividad).  
Overall, we see that in school, female students outperform men by 0.16 standard 
deviations of the mean. Looking at different types of tests, we find that the gender gap 
in performance falls as the stakes of the test increase. Outperformance is highest in low-
stakes tests, 0.18 standard deviations, and lowest in high-stakes tests, 0.11 standard 
deviations. Moreover, in super-high-stakes tests (Panel B), the sign of the coefficient 
reverses (-0.03), such that male students outperform female students. This difference, 
however, is not significant. Panel B shows that the same patterns persist when we 
restrict the analysis to level 6 only. Female students perform relatively better in low-
stakes tests—0.18 standard deviations—than in high-stakes tests—0.08 standard 
deviations.   
In the following analysis, we study students’ relative performance on different 
types of tests.  We estimate the following regression:  
(2)  
  	
    
 
  , 
where the outcome variable is the standardized test score; Female refers, as before, to a 
dummy for female students; and Low_Stake_Test is a dummy variable that takes value 
one when the test score refers to that of low-stakes test and zero otherwise.9  
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters for equation (2). Columns 1 and 2 
compare the low-stakes versus high-stakes tests; columns 2 and 3 compare the low-
stakes versus medium-stakes tests; and, finally,  columns 5 and 6 compare the medium-
stakes versus high-stakes tests. The estimates are done with and without the inclusion of 
 
9
 Similarly, for the comparison of medium stakes and high stakes, the dummy we define is Medium Stake 
Test, which takes the value of 1 when the test is that of medium stakes. 
8 

student fixed effects. In all regressions, the coefficient of interest is the interaction 
between female and the lower-stakes test type.  
Consistent with Table 2, we find that female students perform significantly better 
on low-stakes than on high-stakes tests, by 0.06 standard deviations, and compared to 
medium-stakes tests, by 0.05 standard deviations. Furthermore, the results do not 
change when using an individual fixed-effect estimation. Hence, from now on, we will 
show the results using an OLS regression. From columns 5 and 6, we see that there is no 
significant gender difference when comparing medium- and high-stakes tests.   Thus, in 
the analysis that follows, we will focus only on comparisons between low- and high-
stakes tests.  
To understand whether gender differences change along the students’ academic 
career, we explore the gaps for each academic level separately. Table 4 presents the 
estimation results separately for Levels 1 to 6. Overall, we see similar patterns across all 
levels, with the exception of Level 5, where female students outperform male students 
in low-stakes relative to high-stakes tests, but the difference is not significant. The 
magnitudes do, however, vary. In Levels 1 to 3, the difference is 0.05 standard 
deviations, while in Levels 4 and 6the effect is double (0.10 standard deviations). In 
Level 4, students decide whether or not to stay at the same school for the last two years 
prior to entering university. Since the grades obtained in the last two years count toward 
the university entry grade, this decision is important, as it will affect students’ access to 
university. In Level 6, the students sit their Selectividad exams and the weight on their 
high-school grades is sizeable.  
Looking at the distribution of performance (Table 5), we find that female 
students outperform male students in low-stakes relative to high-stakes tests at all points 
of the distribution. Although the magnitudes vary, there does not appear to be any 
systematic pattern moving from the lowest to highest performers.  
Students undertake several subjects, typically ten or 11, per academic year. In 
Table 6, we disaggregate the analysis by subject type, classifying subjects as either Arts 
or Science.10 Women and men have traditionally shown performance differences that 
depend on the type of subjects, where, following the stereotype, women are, on average, 
more likely to outperform men in the Arts rather than in Science. 
 
10
 Table A.1 in the Appendix classifies subjects between science and arts subjects. 
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Table 6 shows the estimation results for gender difference for science and arts 
subjects separately, for the final grade (columns 1 and 2), for low-stakes tests (columns 
3 and 4), for high-stakes tests (columns 5 and 6). In columns 7 and 8 we bring the 
specifications together by interacting gender with test stakes for science and art 
subjects, respectively. First, looking at the final scores, female students outperform male 
students in Arts subjects, while there is no significant gender difference in Science 
subjects. We clearly see that in low-stakes tests, females outperform males in Arts 
subjects but show no performance difference in Science subjects. In high-stakes tests, 
we find that while females outperform males in Arts subjects (0.25 standard deviations), 
they significantly underperform relative to male students in Science subjects (-0.10 
standard deviations). The gender differences depend on the stakes of the tests, as well as 
on the type of subject. The interactions in columns 7 and 8 show that gender 
differentials regarding the stakes are significant and positive in both Arts and Science 
subjects.  
3.2. Robustness of the main finding 
We perform three robustness checks with respect to the baseline results. The 
results are shown in Table 7. For ease of exposition, column 1 replicates the overall 
gender difference in tests with different stakes (column 1 in Table 3). In column 2, we 
include the teacher fixed effects, in order to see whether teachers’ information explains 
any of the gender differences at different stakes.11 In column 3, we restrict the analysis 
to a balanced sample of students who complete all six levels. Finally, in column 4, we 
exclude student-subjects who have been exempt from high-stakes test. The last two 
robustness checks rule out the possibility that the gender differential effect is driven by 
students who leave school and who are exempt from taking high-stakes tests.     
From column 2, we find that including teacher fixed effects does not change the 
size or the significance of the gender difference in low-stakes versus high-stakes test 
performance. This suggests that the effect is not driven by teachers, as the size and 
significance of the coefficient does not change by adding teachers’ fixed effects. 
Similarly, in column 3, we find that restricting the analysis to students who stay in 
school has a quantitatively small effect. We again see that the interaction effect is 
significant and positive. Finally, students performing very well in low-stakes and 
 
11
 We have teacher information for academic years 2000 to 2009. 
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medium-stakes tests, such that they are getting the highest possible grade throughout the 
course, may be given an exemption from the high-stakes test. Although this is typically 
a very small number of students per subject, sometimes none, we check the robustness 
of our results from excluding them. In column 4, we see the same result, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, thus showing the robustness of the gender differential 
effect that depends on the size of the stakes for each test.  
In Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4, we complement some of this analysis by 
looking at students’ likelihood of leaving the school and of being exempt from a high-
stakes exam, respectively. From Table A.3, we see that there is no gender difference in 
leaving school. Moreover, although high-performing students, as characterized by the 
number of exemptions, are more likely to stay at the school, there is no gender 
differential in this. Table A.4 shows that, conditional on the low-stakes test score, 
female and male students have a similar exemption probability. In Level 1, the 
interaction is negative and significant, suggesting that female students have a smaller 
chance of exemption. However, across levels, there is no systematic pattern in the 
coefficient, which with similar magnitudes is positive, although insignificant, in some 
levels (Levels 3, 4 and 5).   
3.3. Extension: Understanding the gender differential in reaction to stakes 
In this section, we investigate some hypotheses that might help to clarify the 
reasons for gender differences in performance on tests of different stakes. We focus on 
two main hypotheses: (1) the timing of the tests; and (2) the pressure of the test itself.  
The timing for the low-stakes and high-stakes tests differs. Low-stakes tests are 
administered throughout the academic year, while high-stakes tests are administered 
only at the end of the academic year (see Figure 1 for the timing of exams). One 
argument might be that, rather than stakes, these estimates capture a gender difference 
in exam timing. To understand if this is the case, we look at the performance in each of 
the eight low-stakes exams.  Table 8 reports the results. If the gender difference is 
caused by the later-in-the-academic-year characteristic of the high-stakes test, we 
should expect that as the academic year progresses, the gender difference in low-stakes 
relative to the high-stakes test will become smaller. Note that the low-stakes tests in 
Low-Stakes Test 8 are held up until one week before the high-stakes exam. From Table 
8, we see that there is no significant difference in performance across different low-
11 

stakes tests (column 1). Moreover, the estimation results clearly show that there is no 
gender differential effect that depends on the timing of the different low-stakes tests. 
This helps to rule out that the different timing of the low- and high-stakes tests drives 
the identified gender differential effect. We do not observe a gender difference in time 
allocation in the low-stakes test. That is, it does not seem that male students wait until 
the end of the year to study since they do not exhibit a larger increase than girls in their 
test score in the later low-stakes tests. 
Finally, the structure of the Level 6 test system provides us with an efficient way 
to check that it is the pressure of high-stakes tests that explains the gender differences. 
We can exploit the variation at the subject level, which naturally occurs in Level 6. In 
this level, as in all the other levels, students take around ten or 11 subjects. In high 
school, all subjects are examined in the same way as in all other levels. However, one 
important difference is that the national-level examination (i.e., the Selectividad) tests 
students on only around five subjects. The format and material covered in Selectividad 
subjects are the same as in high school. Recall that for the university entry grade, the 
high school Level 6 test score (for all ten or 11 subjects) counts for 25 percent of the 
final grade. The super-high-stakes test scores of the Selectividad (for the smaller set of 
subjects) counts for 50 percent. We can, therefore, classify subjects as those that 
“count” (i.e., Selectividad subjects) and those that “do not count” (i.e., non-Selectividad 
subjects). Whether the subject counts or not will have implications for their stakes. 
Thus, we use the variation in whether the exam counts to see if female and male 
students perform differently in their high school tests. 
Table 9 shows the results for the final grade, low-stakes and high-stakes tests, 
respectively. Three results are noteworthy: first, the first three columns show that 
female students outperform male students in all three types of tests, whether or not it is 
a Selectividad subject. However, as in the baseline specifications, the gender gap is 
smaller in high-stakes exams. Second, students perform relatively better in subjects in 
which they will sit a Selectividad exam than in those that they will not, regardless of the 
exam’s stakes. Finally, from columns 4 to 6, looking at the interaction between gender 
and whether or not the subject is a Selectividad subject, we clearly see that the 
differential gender effect is negative and significant for the final score, as well as for the 
low-stakes tests. This is indicative of the importance of exam stakes. All subjects, 
whether or not they are included on the Selectividad, count the same for the high school 
final grade. It might be that students prepare more for the Selectividad subjects because 
12 
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the national exams carry greater weight, as is suggestive of the difference in 
performance of all students. However, the gender differential, especially in high-stakes 
exams, shows that pressure, in the form of what the exam will eventually count for, 
generates a different reaction among female and male students. Female students 
underperform relative to male students in subjects that are considered higher-stakes 
compared to those considered lower-stakes. This result further confirms that men and 
women respond differently to different stakes.   
4. Discussion and Implications
A recent literature has acknowledged that a behavioral reaction referred to as 
“choking under pressure” can impact individuals’ future success. An increase in stakes 
generally brings an increase in incentives and, therefore, an improvement in 
performance. However, if the increase in stakes is too large, individuals may “choke” 
and actually do worse. We provide empirical evidence that the propensity to choke 
under an increase in the stakes of an exam is different for females and males. In 
particular, outperformance by females is reduced or even disappears as the stakes are 
increased substantially.  
It is important to understand the consequences of gender differences in choking 
under pressure. Here, we discuss the potential labor-market implications of our findings 
that males and females have different levels of pressure-tolerance.  
If selection into jobs is unaffected by individuals’ pressure-tolerance, and if 
pressure tolerance is payoff-relevant to the worker through his or her productivity, then 
we would expect that, all else equal, female workers would earn a lower wage than male 
workers. In particular, for jobs in which pressure is high, we may expect female workers 
to underperform relative to their male counterparts.  
Prior to entering the labor market, however, individuals typically must go through 
a selection process. Individuals self-select into occupations and firms, and employers in 
those firms select those that they want to hire. Pressure in the selection process may 
lead to disregarding individuals with lower pressure-tolerance, at the cost of other, 
potentially productive skills. A firm will interview workers to measure their skills, and 
candidates, when interviewed, provide a signal of their skills that may be affected by 
their tolerance of pressure. The level of pressure in the signaling process may impose a 
tradeoff in the productivity of the selected candidates. That is, increased pressure in the 
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selection process will lead to a workforce with a higher tolerance for pressure, but this 
might come at the expense of other relevant skills.  
In anticipation of the importance of pressure in the signaling process and in the 
firms’ valuation of pressure in the workplace, individuals concerned with their labor- 
market success may self-select into certain occupations and firms. For instance, an 
individual with low pressure-tolerance will avoid firms that reward pressure-tolerance, 
either in the interview stage or on the job, unless other skills can compensate for this 
low tolerance. This might be one explanation of occupational segregation, whereby 
there is an over- (under-) representation of females in some professions while not in 
others. Moreover, recent evidence highlights that females, unless top-performing, 
abandon certain college majors, unlike their male counterparts.12 The concern is that 
these majors tend to lead to high-paying jobs and, again, might explain gender wage 
gaps. In line with our reasoning, if these jobs involve high pressure, lower-performing 
female students are rationally switching majors.  
 In this paper, we find that the increased pressure arising from an increase in the 
stakes induces different reactions in females and males. So far, we have denoted 
pressure as a single-dimension variable. However, as the literature in social psychology 
has acknowledged, there are different sources of pressure, and the reaction to each form 
may be different for different individuals (see Beilock, 2011). For instance, the 
economics literature has also emphasized the asymmetric reactions of males and 
females to competitive environments, even when the stakes are not particularly high. 
Understanding the different sources of pressure and how they affect different groups in 
society is important to understanding the potential inefficiencies in the labor market.  
 
12
 A recent article in the Washington Post, “Women should embrace the B’s in college to make more 
later,” by C. Rampell, cites P. Arciadiacono’s words:  “STEM majors, as with economics, begin with few 
women enrolling and end with even fewer graduating. This leaky pipeline has been somewhat puzzling, 
because women enter college just as prepared as men in math and science.” Similarly, work by Goldin is 
cited showing that the fraction of females graduating in economics is highly decreasing with their grade 
in their introductory economics class in the first year, which is not true for male students.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 OVERALL Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
No. Low-Stakes Tests 38146 6.78 1.19 8994 7.01 0.97 7974 7.03 0.97 6904 6.83 0.99 6435 6.82 1.02 4626 6.6 1.62 3213 5.59 1.47 
No. Medium-Stakes Tests 38146 1.98 0.16 8994 2.00 0.07 7974 2.00 0.04 6904 1.97 0.16 6435 2.00 0.05 4626 1.97 0.23 3213 1.93 0.37 
No. High-Stakes Tests 38146 1.00 0.06 8994 1.00 0 7974 1.00 0 6904 1.00 0.00 6435 1.00 0.00 4626 0.99 0.11 3213 0.97 0.17 
No. Students  38146 309.53 97.53 8994 85.12 6.49 7974 78.17 5.37 6904 69.74 5.12 6435 59.46 7.67 4626 41.7 13.7 3213 35.49 17.06 
Prop. Female Students 38146 0.50 0.06 8994 0.49 0.07 7974 0.50 0.05 6904 0.51 0.06 6435 0.52 0.05 4626 0.51 0.07 3213 0.51 0.06 
No. Subjects 38146 8.11 1.09 8994 7.96 0.25 7974 7.91 0.31 6904 7.83 1.02 6435 8.76 1.54 4626 8.86 0.99 3120 7.22 1.56 
Prop. Leavers  38146 0.10 0.03 -- -- 7974 0.03 0.04 6904 0.07 0.05 6435 0.1 0.05 4626 0.21 0.04 3213 0.1 0.05 
Prop. Students Exempt 38146 0.05 0.08 8555 0.04 0.07 7636 0.04 0.06 6553 0.05 0.07 5753 0.09 0.10 4334 0.05 0.10 3157 0.00 0.02 
Notes: The descriptive statistics are calculated over years 2000 to 2012. Each observation refers to a student-subject. No. Low-Stakes Tests are the number of low-stakes 
tests taken by students for a given subject in a given academic year. Students typically take low-stakes tests bi-monthly (per subject), such that they take around six low-
stakes tests in terms 1 and 2 and four in term 3. We have information only on the average monthly low-stakes test scores. No. Medium-Stakes Tests the number of 
medium-stakes tests taken by students for a given subject in a given academic year. No. High-Stakes Tests are the number of high-stakes tests taken by students for a 
given subject in a given academic year. No. Students is the number of students in a given academic year. Prop. Female Students is the proportion of female students in a 
given academic year. No. Subjects is the number of subjects that students take in a given academic year. Prop. Leavers is the proportion of students who leave at the end 
of the previous academic year. Prop. Students Exempt is the proportion on students given an exemption from a high-stakes test in one (or more) of the subjects in a given 
academic year.  
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Table 2: Performance under Different Stakes 
A: Performance under Different Stakes: Overall 
Final Low-Stakes Medium-Stakes High-Stakes Super-High-Stakes 
Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score 
Female 0.159*** 0.175*** 0.126*** 0.118*** -0.0301 
[0.0419] [0.0438] [0.0407] [0.0374] [0.0382] 
Constant -0.0799*** -0.0884*** -0.0636** -0.0595** 0.016 
[0.0294] [0.0309] [0.0283] [0.0263] [0.0272] 
Observations 38,146 38,637 38,247 38,857 2,598 
R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.001 
B: Performance under Different Stakes: Level 6 only 
Final Low Stakes Medium Stakes High Stakes Super High Stakes 
Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score 
Female 0.169*** 0.185*** 0.0939*** 0.0803** -0.0301 
[0.0344] [0.0336] [0.0345] [0.0332] [0.0382] 
Constant -0.0820*** -0.0937*** -0.0467* -0.0407* 0.016 
[0.0244] [0.0239] [0.0246] [0.0236] [0.0272] 
Observations 3,213 3,372 3,207 3,473 2,598 
R-squared 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. Final Test Score is the students’ accumulated test score at the end of the academic 
year. Low-Stakes Test Score is the students’ test score in the low-stakes tests; Medium-Stakes Test Score is the 
students’ test score in the medium-stakes tests; High-Stakes Test Score is the students’ test score in the high-
stakes tests; and Super-High-Stakes Test Score is the students’ test score in the national exams, Selectividad, 
taken in Level 6. All test scores are standardized to a distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation. 
The standardization is done by academic year, level, subject and test type. 
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Table 3: Performance under Different Stakes with Interactions 
Low-Stakes vs. High-Stakes Low-Stakes vs. Med.-Stakes 
Med.-Stakes vs. High-
Stakes 
Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score 
Female 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 
[0.0374] [0.0407] [0.0374] 
Low-Stakes Test -0.0290*** -0.0277*** -0.0248*** -0.0253*** 
[0.00897] [0.00899] [0.00730] [0.00718] 
Female*Low-Stakes Test 0.0574*** 0.0579*** 0.0490*** 0.0513*** 
[0.0124] [0.0124] [0.00988] [0.00979] 
Med.-Stakes Test -0.00418 
[0.00722] 
Female*Med.-Stakes 
Test 0.00845 0.0048 
[0.0102] [0.00719] 
Constant -0.0595** -0.000747 -0.0636** -0.00026 -0.0595** -0.00116 
[0.0263] [0.00309] [0.0283] [0.00246] [0.0263] [0.00180] 
Observations 77,494 77,494 76,884 76,884 77,104 77,104 
R-squared 0.006 0 0.006 0 0.004 0 
No. of students 1,404 1,404 1,404 
Student FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level. Low-Stakes vs. High-Stakes compares low-stakes test scores with high-stakes test scores. Low-
Stakes vs. Med.-Stakes compares low-stakes test scores with medium-stakes test scores. Med.-Stakes vs. High-Stakes 
compares medium-stakes test scores with high-stakes test scores. Low-Stakes Test takes the value one if the test is a 
low-stakes test and zero otherwise. Med.-Stakes Test takes the value one if the test is a medium-stakes test and zero 
otherwise. All test scores are standardized.  
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Table 4: Performance under Different Stakes with Interactions by Level 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 
Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score 
Female 0.210*** 0.127*** 0.119** 0.026 0.0796 0.0803 
[0.0436] [0.0459] [0.0486] [0.0532] [0.0566] [0.0595] 
Low-Stakes Test -0.0233* -0.0247 -0.0244* -0.0492*** -0.00791 -0.0529** 
[0.0130] [0.0159] [0.0148] [0.0153] [0.0202] [0.0218] 
Female*Low-Stakes 
Test 0.0472** 0.0489** 0.0482** 0.0957*** 0.0155 0.105*** 
[0.0189] [0.0219] [0.0215] [0.0210] [0.0270] [0.0332] 
Constant -0.104*** -0.0639** -0.0601* -0.0134 -0.0406 -0.0407 
[0.0303] [0.0324] [0.0327] [0.0375] [0.0421] [0.0432] 
Observations 18,112 16,026 14,156 13,108 9,247 6,845 
R-squared 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. The regressions compares low-stakes test scores with high-stakes test scores. 
All test scores are standardized. Low-Stakes Test takes the value one if the test is a low-stakes test and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 5: Performance under Different Stakes with Interactions by Quantiles 
Q10 
Test Score 
Q20 
Test Score 
Q30 
Test Score 
Q40 
Test Score 
Q50 
Test Score 
Q60 
Test Score 
Q70 
Test Score 
Q80 
Test Score 
Q90 
Test Score 
Female 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.140*** 0.207*** 0.153*** 0.104*** 0.0814*** 
[0.0117] [0.00938] [0.0145] [0.0139] [0.0127] [0.0215] [0.0138] [0.0181] [0.0136] 
Low-Stakes Test 0.0444*** -0.0170** -0.0158 -0.0598*** -0.0581*** -0.108*** -0.172*** -0.102*** 0.0274 
[0.0119] [0.00847] [0.0127] [0.0143] [0.0111] [0.0257] [0.0205] [0.0192] [0.0203] 
Female*Low-Stakes Test 0.0425*** 0.0636*** 0.0769*** 0.0832*** 0.0679*** 0.00819 0.0594** 0.0604** 0.0377* 
[0.0122] [0.0137] [0.0182] [0.0184] [0.0182] [0.0267] [0.0241] [0.0263] [0.0217] 
Constant -1.276*** -0.932*** -0.702*** -0.441*** -0.200*** 0.130*** 0.533*** 0.914*** 1.341*** 
[0.00909] [0.00657] [0.0106] [0.0102] [0.00615] [0.0202] [0.0130] [0.00966] [0.00994] 
Observations 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 77,494 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Q10 to Q90 
represent the 10th to 90th deciles. The regressions compares low-stakes test scores with high-stakes test scores. All test scores are standardized. Low- 
Stakes Test takes the value one if the test is a low-stakes test and zero otherwise. 
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Table 6: Performance under Different Stakes with and without Interactions for Science versus Arts Subjects 
Final Low-Stakes High-Stakes Low vs. High 
 Test Score  Test Score  Test Score  Test Score 
Science Arts Science Arts Science Arts Science Arts 
Female -0.0689 0.298*** -0.0499 0.312*** -0.101*** 0.250*** -0.101*** 0.250*** 
[0.0452] [0.0438] [0.0468] [0.0458] [0.0388] [0.0407] [0.0388] [0.0407] 
Low-Stakes Test -0.0252* -0.0316*** 
[0.0134] [0.00902] 
Female*Low-Stakes Test 0.0507*** 0.0622*** 
[0.0176] [0.0127] 
Constant 0.0358 -0.152*** 0.0249 -0.159*** 0.0501* -0.127*** 0.0501* -0.127*** 
[0.0322] [0.0309] [0.0342] [0.0319] [0.0275] [0.0288] [0.0275] [0.0288] 
Observations 14,405 23,741 14,589 24,048 14,623 24,234 29,212 48,282 
R-squared 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.02 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. Final Test Score is the students’ accumulated test score at the end of the academic year. Low-Stakes Test 
Score is the students’ score on the low-stakes tests, High-Stakes Test Score is the students’ score on the high-stakes 
tests. Low-Stakes vs. High-Stakes compares low-stakes test scores with high-stakes test scores. Science subjects are 
subjects that are classified as science subjects. Art are subjects that are classified as humanity subjects. A full list of 
subjects is given in Table A.1. 
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Table 7: Robustness checks: Teacher Fixed Effects, Staying Students and Students 
Exempt from the High-Stakes Test 
Test Scores Test Scores Test Scores Test Scores 
Female 0.118*** 0.158* 0.0887 -0.125*** 
[0.0374] [0.0887] [0.0553] [0.0349] 
Low-Stake Tests -0.0290*** -0.0254** 0.0216 0.0325*** 
[0.00897] [0.0106] [0.0145] [0.00860] 
Female*Low-Stakes Test 0.0574*** 0.0502*** 0.0458** -0.0655*** 
[0.0124] [0.0140] [0.0191] [0.0125] 
Constant -0.0595** -0.086 0.194*** 0.0619** 
[0.0263] [0.0670] [0.0391] [0.0253] 
Observations 77,494 54,520 37,020 72,774 
R-squared 0.006 0.021 0.004 0.007 
Teacher FE No Yes No No 
Students in sample for all 6 levels No No Yes No 
Student-subjects not exempt No No No Yes 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. The regressions compare low-stakes test scores with 
high-stakes test scores. All test scores are standardized. Low-Stakes Test takes the value one if 
the test is a low-stakes test and zero otherwise. Column 2 includes teacher fixed effects. 
Teacher identity is available only for years 2000 to 2009. Column 3 is restricted to cohorts of 
students who are in the sample for all six levels. Column 4 excludes test scores for when 
students are exempt from sitting the high-stakes exams. 
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Table 8: Exploiting the different Timing of Low-Stakes Tests 
Test 
Score 
Test 
Score 
Female 0.142*** 0.151*** 
[0.0357] [0.0352] 
Low_Stakes_Test2 -9.24E-05 -0.00308 
[0.00561] [0.00760] 
Low_Stakes_Test3 1.79E-05 0.00625 
[0.00631] [0.00871] 
Low_Stakes_Test4 -0.000187 0.00423 
[0.00492] [0.00666] 
Low_Stakes_Test5 -6.54E-05 0.00734 
[0.00588] [0.00800] 
Low_Stakes_Test6 0.000534 -0.000204 
[0.00644] [0.00879] 
Low_Stakes_Test7 0.000132 0.00922 
[0.0162] [0.0223] 
Low_Stakes_Test8 -0.000233 0.0231 
[0.0166] [0.0234] 
Female*Low_Stakes_Test2 0.00591 
[0.0112] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test3 -0.0123 
[0.0126] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test4 -0.00876 
[0.00982] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test5 -0.0147 
[0.0117] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test6 0.00147 
[0.0129] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test7 -0.0181 
[0.0323] 
Female* Low_Stakes_Test8 -0.0463 
[0.0332] 
Constant -0.0715*** -0.0757*** 
[0.0250] [0.0245] 
Observations 262,568 262,568 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 
1% level. The regressions compare test scores on low-stakes tests taken throughout the year. Low_Stakes_Test2 to 
Low_Stakes_Test8 are the second to last low-stakes test in an academic year. The first low-stakes test is the omitted 
category. All test scores are standardized. 
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Table 9: Selectividad Subject versus Non-Selectividad Subject (Level 6 only). 
Final Low-Stakes High-Stakes Final Low-Stakes High-Stakes 
Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score Test Score 
Female 0.170*** 0.187*** 0.0829** 0.316*** 0.336*** 0.127* 
[0.0343] [0.0341] [0.0344] [0.0718] [0.0713] [0.0719] 
Selectividad Subject 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.148*** 0.214*** 0.210*** 0.177*** 
[0.0409] [0.0406] [0.0409] [0.0583] [0.0580] [0.0584] 
Female*Selectividad Subject -0.189** -0.193** -0.057 
[0.0817] [0.0812] [0.0818] 
Constant -0.173*** -0.184*** -0.141*** -0.247*** -0.260*** -0.164*** 
[0.0400] [0.0397] [0.0400] [0.0513] [0.0510] [0.0514] 
Observations 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 
R-squared 0.01 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.006 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. Final Test Score is the students’ accumulated test score at the end of the academic 
year. Low-Stakes Test Score is the students’ test score on the low-stakes tests, High-Stakes Test Score is the 
students’ test score on the high-stakes tests. Selectividad Subject are subjects in which a students will do the 
national exams at the end of Level 6.  
Figure 1: Evaluation System in the School 
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Notes: This is the evaluation system used in each subject. Low-Stakes is the test that each counts for around 2.5 
percent of the final grade. Medium-Stakes is the test that each counts for around 11 percent of the final grade. 
High-Stakes is the test that counts for around 27 percent of the final grade. Super-High-Stakes is the national 
exams, Selectividad, taken at the end of Level 6, which counts for 50 percent of the university entry test score.  
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Tables and Figures in the Appendix 
Table A.1: List of Subjects and their Classification as Science or Arts Subject 
List of Subjects Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Arts-Science 
Spanish X X X X X X Arts 
Catalan X X X X X X Arts 
English X X X X X X Arts 
French X X X X X X Arts 
Math X X X X X X Science 
Biology X X X X X X Science 
History-Geography X X X X X X Arts 
IT X X X X X Science 
Chemistry-Physics X X X X Science 
Latin X X X Arts 
Technical Drawing X X X Science 
Art History X X Arts 
Contemporary Sciences X Arts 
Economics X X Science 
Math Applied to Social 
Sciences X X Arts 
Philosophy X X Arts 
Audiovisual Culture X Arts 
History Philosophy X Arts 
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Table A.2: Probability of Leaving School 
Overall Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Pr.( Staying) Pr.(Leaving) Pr.(Leaving) Pr.(Leaving) Pr.(Leaving) 
Female -0.0254 -0.0378 0.0164 0.0139 0.0119 
[0.0377] [0.0233] [0.0218] [0.0314] [0.0157] 
No. Exemptions 0.0289*** -0.0141* -0.011 -0.0306*** -0.00427 
[0.00643] [0.00801] [0.00737] [0.00902] [0.00343] 
Female*No. Exemptions 0.00346 0.00596 -0.00192 0.0144 0.00241 
[0.00867] [0.0105] [0.00980] [0.0100] [0.00427] 
Observations 875 875 825 771 707 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. Pr. (Staying) is the probability that the student will stay in 
school for all six levels. Pr. (Leaving) is the probability that the student will leave at the end of the 
previous academic year. No. Exemptions is the number of exemptions (at the subject level) a student 
has from sitting high-stakes tests. Controls include year and subject dummies. 
Table A.3: Probability of being Exempt from High-Stakes Test 
Overall Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 
Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) Pr.(Exempt) 
Female 0.00268 0.138** 0.0931* -0.133 -0.111 -0.0928 0.0482 
[0.0351] [0.0542] [0.0556] [0.0934] [0.0776] [0.0958] [0.0426] 
Score_LS_Test 0.0646*** 0.0806*** 0.0718*** 0.0567*** 0.107*** 0.0558*** -0.00128 
[0.00401] [0.00665] [0.00576] [0.0111] [0.00824] [0.0120] [0.00328] 
Female* 
Score_LS_Test 0.00103 -0.0214** -0.0114 0.0227 0.0185 0.014 -0.00581 
[0.00532] [0.00841] [0.00866] [0.0138] [0.0117] [0.0136] [0.00557] 
Observations 38,409 8,824 8,013 7,079 6,555 4,565 3,373 
R-squared 0.144 0.201 0.175 0.229 0.237 0.235 0.198 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level. Pr. (Exempt) is the probability that the student is exempt from a subject’s high-stakes test. 
Score_LS_Test is the average test score in the low-stakes tests in the subject from which the student is exempt. 
Controls include year and subject dummies. 
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